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Introduction
The common law1 takes a dim view of the defaulting contractor. 
It gives him remedies grudgingly. In an action by . the defaulter, 
emphasis is placed not on what the other party receives or suffers 
but rather on whether the plaintiff has performed his side of the 
bargain.2 The defaulting contractor has an uphill battle, for the 
general rule of the common law is that the performance of a contract 
must be precise and exact.3 Indeed, the rule of thumb used by 
the busy practitioner is that “ no remedy is open to the partial 
performer” .4 The purpose of this paper is to test the reliability 
of that rule of thumb.
Both remedies on the contract and outside the contract w:ll be 
discussed, although the discussion will be by no means exhaustive. 
Emphasis will be placed on the decisions of Canadian courts. 
Finally, as the title implies, this paper is concerned only with the 
rights of the defaulting contractor in respect of services rendered 
and goods supplied before breach.
Where the Defaulting Party Has a Remedy on the Contract
It is clear law that not every breach of contract disentitles the 
defaulting party to a remedy on the contract. Our problem is to
* This essay was prepared for the Seminar on Restitution.
X Karl John Dore, III Law, U.N.B. Mr. Dore is a Sir James Dunn Scholar 
in Law.
1 The expression “common law” is used here to mean the law that is not 
the result of legislation.
2 Dussault and Pageau v. The King (1917), 58 S.C.R. 1, per Sir Charles Fitz­
patrick C.J., at p. 4: “The fallacy underlying the claim and partly adopted 
in the judgment appealed from consists in treating the case as if it were an 
action by the respondent for breach of the contract. The case is, however, 
quite different and the question of damages sustained does not enter into 
it at all. In an action for breach of contract the plaintiff must, of course, 
prove his damages and cannot recover if it is shewn tint he has sustained 
none. It is, however, useless for the appellants to shew that the respondent 
suffered no damage, unless they can shew that this fact gives them a claim 
on the respondent. This is not done and the appellants can only claim, if 
at all, under the terms of the contract. They can only succeed if they are 
able to prove a claim regardless of whether or not the respondent suffered 
any loss by the oreach of the contract.”
3 G. C. Cheshire and C. H. S. Fifoot, The Law o f Contract (6th ed., 1964), 
pp. 458 ff.
4 Ibid., at p. 459.
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define the limits within which a party, though in breach of his 
contract, may recover upon it.
In attempting to define these limits, it is common practice to 
speak of contracts as being either entire or divisible. An entire 
contract has been defined as follows:5
An entire contract is one in which it has been expressly or im­
plicitly agreed that neither party shall be entitled to demand perform­
ance, either in whole or in part, until he himself has completely 
fulfilled, or is ready and willing to fulfil, his own promise. To put 
this in other language, a contract is entire if the promises are inter­
dependent.
In contrast, a divisible contract is one where the promises are 
independent. Whether a contract is entire or divisible depends upon 
what the court finds to be the intention of the parties. But where 
the consideration is unapportioned, for example, a contract for a 
lump sum, the courts usually construe the contract to be entire.
Where the contract is entire, the position of the defaulting 
contractor has been summarized by Blackburn J. in the following 
words :6
. . .  the plaintiffs, having contracted to do an entire work for a specific 
sum, can recover nothing unless the work be done, or it can be shown 
that it was the defendants’ fault that the work was incomplete, or 
that there is something to justify the conclusion that the parties have 
entered into a fresh contract.
To mitigate the harshness of this rule, the courts developed the 
doctrine of substantial performance.7
Other jurists have viewed dependent and independent promises 
in a slightly different light and say that even if the promises are 
dependent,8
. . .  in the absence of express words, entire performance by the plaintiff 
of the consideration is not a condition precedent to his right to demand 
performance by the defendant of his promise. If there has been 
substantial performance by the plaintiff, he is entitled to demand 
performance by the defendant; or, conversely, the defendant is only 
excused if he can show a breach or failure of performance by the 
plaintiff such as to go to the whole of the consideration.
Furthermore, they say,9
T h e. . .  cases where the plaintiff failed because entire performance 
was a condition precedent will be found on examination to be but
5 Ibid., at p. 461.
6 Appleby v. Myers (1867), L.R. 2 C.P. 651 (Ex. Ch.), at p. 661.
7 The doctrine of substantial performance is discussed below.
8 J. W. Smith, Leading Cases (13th ed., 1929, by Sir T. W. Chitty and others), 
at p. 16.
9 Ibid., at pp. 25, 26.
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illustrations of that wider principle of the law . . .  that where there 
is a failure of performance by the plaintiff which goes to the whole 
of the consideration of the defendant’s promise, the defendant is 
excused from performance of his promise; for where entire performance 
is a condition precedent, the whole and no less is the consideration 
for the defendant’s promise . . .
The language of the parties must be very strong to make entire 
performance a condition precedent upon this view of the matter. 
Thus in Boone v. Eyre 10 a covenant by the defendant in a deed 
that . . the plaintiff well and truly performing all and everything 
therein contained on his part to be performed, he, the defendant, 
would pay the annuity” 11 was held not to be sufficient to make 
entire performance by the plaintiff a condition precedent to a right 
of action on the defendant’s covenant.
Whichever view one prefers, the practical result is usually the 
same,12 because on either view complete performance and nothing 
less will be required if the parties expressly agree to make it a condi­
tion.13 But where there has been substantial performance, the courts 
will lean against treating complete performance as a condition 
precedent to an action on the contract.
It is clear then, that where the defaulting party has substantially 
performed the contract, he is usually entitled to recover upon the 
contract, subject only to a cross-action or counterclaim for the 
defects or omissions in execution. Thus in Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee14 
a building contractor who had substantially performed his contract 
was allowed to recover. In the words of Sankey J .:15
Where a builder has supplied work and labour for the erection 
or repair of a house under a lump sum contract, but has departed 
from the terms of the contract, he is entitled to recover for his services, 
unless (1) the work that he has done has been of no benefit to the 
owner; (2) the work he has done is entirely different from the work 
which he has contracted to do; or (3) he has abandoned the work 
and left it unfinished.
10 (1777), 1 Hy. Bl. 273 n., 126 E.R. 160 n.(a) (K.B.).
11 Ibid.
12 There may be a conflict between the two views where the contract is wholly 
executory.
13 J. W. Smith, Leading Cases (13th ed., 1929, by Sir T. W. Chitty and others), 
at pp. 22, 26; Glanville L. Williams, Partial Performance o f Entire Contracts,
II (1941), 57 Law Q. Rev. 490, at p. 494.
14 [1916] 1 K.B. 566 (K.B.).
15 Ibid., at p. 574.
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The principle of Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee16 has been accepted 
both in England17 and in Canada.18 Indeed, as early as 1857, a 
New Brunswick court allowed recovery of a lump sum of £3,250 
under a building contract, subject to a deduction of £83 for the 
value of work undone.19 Where there has been substantial per­
formance, the measure of recovery is the contract price less a deduc­
tion sufficient to remedy the defects or omissions.20
Furthermore, it is submitted, the doctrine of substantial per­
formance is not limited to building contracts. In McGregor and 
McIntyre Co. Ltd. v. Sterling Appraisal Co. Ltd.,21 the doctrine 
was applied to a contract to make an appraisal of buildings, 
machinery and plant. The appraisal turned out to be partially 
inaccurate, and it was argued that since this was a contract to do 
specific work for a lump sum, and since that work had not been 
completed, the defaulting party had no right to recover on the 
contract. The Ontario Court of Appeal rejected the submission 
and allowed recovery on the principle of Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee.22 
Masten J.A. said:23
The rule adopted in the Dakin case is not limited to building 
contracts, but has been applied in the case of architects, of solicitors, 
and of auctioneers.
The doctrine of substantial performance is of general application. 
Thus a servant who failed in his duty only a few times during a 
year would be entitled to rely on the doctrine o f substantial per­
formance.24
Whether there has been substantial performance of a contract 
is a question of fact.25 Little guidance can be found in the cases,26
16 Ibid.
17 Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 (C.A.).
18 Inch v. Farmers' Co-Operative Dairy Co. Ltd., [1941] 2 D.L.R. 27 (N.B.C.A.); 
Hulshan v. Nick ling et al, [1957] O.W.N. 587 (Ont. C.A.); Webber v. Havill
(1964), 50 M.P.R. 172 (N.S. Sup. Ct. in banco); Fairbanks Soap Co. Ltd. 
v. Sheppard, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 314.
19 Small v. McCullough (1857), 8 N.B.R. 484.
20 Inch v. Farmers' Co-Operative Dairy Co. Ltd., [1941] 2 D.L.R. 27 (N.B.C.A.).
21 (1925), 57 O.L.R. 485 (Ont. C.A.).
22 [1916] 1 K.B. 566 (K.B.).
23 (1925), 57 O.L.R. 485 (Ont. C.A.), at pp. 492, 493.
24 See Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 (C.A.), per Somervell L.J., at 
p. 178.
25 Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 (C.A.), per Romer L. J., at p. 182; 
Downie & Hatt v. Norman (1964), 50 M.P.R. 150 (N.S. Sup. Ct. in banco), 
at p. 157.
26 Webber v. Havill (1964), 50 M.P.R. 172 (N.S. Sup. Ct. in banco), per 
MacQuarrie J., at p. 181.
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but it seems clear that where the work is only half done the default­
ing party cannot be said to have substantially performed.27 Further­
more, the courts have drawn a distinction between misfeasance 
(defects) and nonfeasance (abandonment). Recovery is allowed 
where there is misfeasance, but not where there is nonfeasance;28 
however, slight nonfeasance is treated as misfeasance.29 The point 
made by the courts is that abandonment of the contract will dis­
entitle the defaulting party to a remedy on the contract. But 
“ . . . there cannot be an abandonment without an intention express 
or implied and carried into effect to throw up the contract, to 
quit and leave the job unfinished” .30
Finally, to say that the doctrine of substantial performance is 
not limited to building contracts but is of general application is 
not to say that acts that amount to substantial performance in one 
type of contract will amount to substantial performance in another 
type. What amounts to substantial performance depends largely on 
the type of contract involved.
Rights of the Defaulting Contractor Arising from the Course of Action 
Taken by the Innocent Party
Until now we have focused attention on the acts of the default­
ing contractor. But where the defaulting party has committed such 
a breach that he is unable to recover on the contract, the course 
of action taken by the innocent party is relevant to the defaulter’s 
position. For the conduct that disentitles the defaulting party from 
recovering on the contract is the same conduct that entitles the 
innocent party to take one of several courses of action. The innocent 
party may waive the breach or accept it as discharging the contract. 
If he accepts the breach as discharging the contract, he is excused 
from further performance and may sue either for damages or in 
quasi-contract.31 If the innocent party wants to sue in quasi-contract, 
he must first bring the contract to an end.
If the innocent party waives the breach, the defaulting party 
may recover on the contract, subject, o f course, to a cross-action 
or counterclaim for damages. A recent and instructive decision
27 Sumpter v. Hedges, [1898] 1 Q.B. 673 (C.A.); Bradley v. Horner (1957),
10 D.L.R. (2d) 446 (Ont. C.A.).
28 Webber v. Havill (1964), 50 M.P.R. 172 (N.S. Sup. Ct. in banco).
29 Dakin & Co. Ltd. v. Lee, [1916] 1 K.B. 566 (K.B.).
30 Hulshan v. Nickling et al, [1957] O.W.N. 587 (Ont. C.A.), per Roach J.A., 
at p. 589.
31 The innocent party must elect to sue for damages or in quasi-contract, 
because he cannot do both: Gregory v. Williams (1916), 44 N.B.R. 204.
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on the effect of waiver was given by the Ontario Court of Appeal 
in Tanenbaum and Downsview Meadows Ltd. v. Wright-Winston 
L td}2 In that case there was a lump sum contract under which the 
plaintiff was to build a sewer main and pumping station for sewage 
disposal from the defendant’s subdivision. After constructing the 
sewer main, the plaintiff abandoned the contract without good 
cause. The defendant, with full knowledge o f the plaintiff’s breach 
of contract, constructed the pumping station at his own expense 
and connected it to the sewer main that had been built by the 
plaintiff. A material fact was that the sewer main built by the 
plaintiff was not on the defendant’s land.
The court found that the plaintiff was in substantial breach of 
the contract. He could not recover on a quantum meruit because he 
had not adduced evidence of the reasonable value of the sewer 
main. But the court held that by connecting the pumping station 
to the sewer main with knowledge of the plaintiffs breach, the 
defendant took advantage of the work done in partial compliance 
with the contract and thus waived the breach. The plaintiff was 
awarded the contract price less the cost of building the pumping
station.33
The innocent party may not, however, waive the breach; he 
may accept it as a discharge of the contract and of his own duty 
to perform. In this case he may sue for damages or in quasi-contract. 
If he sues for damages, an allowance may be made to the defaulting 
party for the benefits he has conferred.34
Instead of claiming damages, the innocent party may sue in 
quasi-contract to recover back money paid by him under the contract, 
but this elective is open to him only if he has either suffered a total 
failure of consideration or is in a position to make restitution of 
benefits that have been conferred upon him by the defaulting party. 
In Brazeau v. Wilson,35 the plaintiff contracted to install in the 
defendant’s house a heating system. He failed to do this properly. 
In an action by the plaintiff to enforce a mechanic’s lien, the de­
fendant relied on the plaintiff’s failure to perform the contract, 
and counterclaimed for the return of the money he had paid under 
the contract. The court held that the plaintiff could not recover 
on the contract because he was in substantial breach. The defendant’s
32 (1965), 49 D.L.R. (2d) 386 (Ont. C.A.).
33 See also Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 (C.A.), per Denning L.J., 
at p. 181.
34 Charterhouse Credit Co. Ltd. v. Tolly, [1963] 2 Q.B. 683 (C.A.).
35 (1916), 36 O.L.R. 396 (Ont. C.A.).
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counterclaim was allowed subject to the condition that the plaintiff 
be allowed to take back the materials he had supplied. Meredith
C.J.C.P. said:36
The result is, that the plaintiff has not furnished that which he 
contracted to supply; he has not substantially fulfilled his contract, 
and so is not entitled to the price that was to be paid to him on ful­
filment of the contract; and to that extent the judgment is right. But 
the defendant is not entitled to retain the boiler, radiator, pipes, etc., 
put in by the plaintiff. The defendant recovers, according to his defence 
on which the judgment in appeal is based, on the ground that the 
whole work is useless, and must be, as he terms it, scrapped, which 
means necessarily taking out and discarding these articles. When so 
taken out, they must be thr property of the plaintiff, not of the de­
fendant, and the plaintiff is i * 1 entitled to them. The principle applied 
in such a case as Oldershi v v. Garner (1876), 38 U.C.Q.B.R. 37, 
adopting and following the ruling in Munro v. Butt (1858), 8 E. & B.
738; 120 E.R. 275, is obviously not applicable to such a case as this, to 
fixtures which are to be unfixed and taken out, or, as I really think 
was intended by the defendant, not to be taken out, but to be utilised 
for his benefit under a new contract for the heating of his house.
If the innocent party has rendered services or supplied goods 
under a contract, he can, instead of suing for damages, proceed 
by way of quantum meruit,37 But if he has received the benefit of 
a partial performance by the defaulting party, it is not clear whether 
he has a quantum meruit claim. If he does, presumably the defaulting 
party would be allowed to set off the value of his part performance.38
It might appear that the position of the defaulting contractor 
is not too precarious after all, but actually it is. In the waiver 
situations, but for the course of action taken by the innocent party 
the defaulting party would have no rights under the contract, and 
in the other situations the defaulting party is being sued. And 
the fact that the innocent party decides to sue, in the one case 
for damages and in the other in quasi-contract, indicates that the 
innocent party has suffered greater damage than the value of the 
benefits conferred upon him by the defaulting party. The crucial 
question is this: what is the position where the innocent party 
receives a benefit from the defaulting party’s partial performance 
the value of which is greater than he can recover in a suit for damages 
or in quasi-contract? Can he keep the benefits? The answer of the 
common law is most unsatisfactory.
36 Ibid., at pp. 397, 398.
37 McHugh v. Murray (1884), 24 N.B.R. 12; Swim v. Amos (1895), 33 N.B.R. 
49; Gregory v. Williams (1916), 44 N.B.R. 204; Jardine v. The Prescott 
Lumber Company Limited (1917), 44 N.B.R. 505.
38 See Salmond and Williams, Principles o f the Law o f Contracts (2d ed., 1945), 
p. 563, n.(f).
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Restitutionary Rights of the Defaulting Contractor
(a) General Rule 
The result of the cases is that an innocent party must reject the 
partial performance by the defaulting party if he has an opportunity 
to do so. But the innocent party is not regarded as having an op­
portunity to reject the partial performance if its return in specie 
is not possible. Furthermore, return in specie is not regarded as 
being possible where the partial performance has been incorporated 
into the property of the innocent party. The position is well illus­
trated by Sumpter v. Hedges,39 In that case the plaintiff entered 
into a building contract for a lump sum with the defendant. He 
did part of the work and then abandoned the contract because 
of financial difficulties. The defendant finished the building himself, 
using for that purpose certain building materials which the plaintiff 
had left lying on the defendant’s land. It was held that the plaintiff 
could recover for the building materials so used, but he could not 
recover the value of the work he had done. In refusing the latter 
claim, Collins L.J. said:40
There are cases in which, though the plaintiff has abandoned 
the performance of a contract, it is possible for him to raise the 
inference of a new contract to pay for the work done on a quantum 
meruit from the defendant’s having taken the benefit of that work, 
but, in order that that may be done, the circumstances must be such 
as to give an option to the defendant to take or not to take the benefit 
of the work done. It is only where the circumstances are such as to 
give that option that there is any evidence on which to ground the 
inference of a new contract. Where, as in the case of work done on 
land, the circumstances are such as to give the defendant no option 
whether he will take the benefit of the work or not, then one must 
look to other facts than the mere taking the benefit of the work in 
order to ground the inference of a new contract. In this case I see no 
other facts on which such an inference can be founded. The mere 
fact that a defendant is in possession of what he cannot help keeping, 
or even has done work upon it, affords no ground for such an inference.
He is not bound to keep unfinished a building which in an incomplete 
state would be a nuisance on his land. I am therefore of opinion that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to recover for the work which he had done.
It is clear then, that unless the innocent party has freely accepted 
the benefits of the partial performance by the defaulting party, the 
latter is without a remedy. This is so because the courts have refused 
to impose on the innocent party any obligation by law where the 
partial performance cannot be returned in specie. Instead, in such 
a case, they require proof of acts from which a new contract can 
be implied in fact.
39 [1898] 1 Q.B. 673 (C.A.).
40 Ibid., at pp. 676, 677.
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(b) Specific Applications o f  the Rule 
We will now examine some specific applications of the general 
rule discussed above.
(i) Master and Servant
The position of the defaulting servant at common law has been 
summarized as follows:41
Where a servant is engaged at so much for a specified period 
(e.g. quarter or year), and for some reason (other than a breach of 
contract by the master) fails to complete the term, the rule at common 
law is that he can recover nothing.
Thus in Knox v. Munro42 the plaintiff entered into a lump sum con­
tract to work for the defendant for eight months. At the end of 
four months, the plaintiff left the defendant’s service without good 
cause, and sued in quantum meruit. In dismissing the action, Bain J. 
said :43
As no time was specified for the payment of the $130, under 
the special agreement, they would not become payable until the 
plaintiff had performed the work which was the consideration for 
the payment. Having left before the end of the eight months, he cannot, 
of course, be entitled to the $130; and as he left without any valid 
reason or excuse, it seems clear that he is not entitled to recover any 
portion of the $130 as wages for the part of the time that he worked . . .
Then, when he quit work, the special agreement was still sub­
sisting; and it is a proposition of law that cannot be disputed, that 
no new contract can be implied from acts done under an express 
contract which still subsists . . .  He is not, therefore, entitled to recover 
anything on a quantum meruit for the work he actually did.
It is clear from the foregoing that the position of the defaulting 
servant at common law is not an enviable one. Where the servant 
has committed a fundamental breach, the master can dismiss him 
and refuse to pay for the value of the services rendered in partial 
performance. The servant cannot rely on a new contract to pay a 
reasonable amount for the partial performance because the master 
has not had an opportunity to accept or reject the services rendered. 
There is nothing the master can restore.44 The servant therefore 
is without a remedy.45
41 Glanville L. Williams, Partial Performance o f Entire Contracts, I (1941), 
57 Law Q. Rev. 373, at p. 375.
42 (1900), 13 Man. L.R. 16 (Man. K.B.).
43 Ibid., at p. 18.
44 Trustees of School District No. 7$, Parish o f Bright, York County v. Yerxa 
(1910), 40 N.B.R. 351 (N.B.C.A.), per Barker C.J., at pp. 359, 360.
45 Selig v. Arenburg (1917), 51 N.S.R. 198 (N.S. Sup. Ct.); Allcroft and Prescott 
v. Adams (1906), 38 S.C.R. 365 (Can. Sup. Ct.); Pimlott et al. v. Marbridge 
Investments Ltd. (1967), 61 D.L.R. (2d) 309 (B.C.C.V).
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More promising to the defaulting servant is certain remedial 
legislation dealing with apportionment.46 The New Brunswick 
Property A ct47 for example, deals with apportionment in sections 
3 through 7. Section 3 reads:48
All rents, annuities, dividends and other periodical payments 
in the nature of income, whether reserved or made payable under 
an instrument in writing or otherwise, shall be considered as accruing 
from day to day, and shall be apportionable in respect of time 
accordingly.
A number of things should be noted about this section and the 
others dealing with apportionment. First, section 3 applies only 
to periodic payments. Second, by section 6, “annuities” include 
salaries and pensions. Wages would probably be included either 
in “annuities” or in “other periodic payments” . Third, by section 4, 
the apportioned part cannot be recovered until the entirety or next 
portion thereof is due. Finally, by section 7(2), the apportionment 
sections of the act “ shall not extend to any case in which it is 
expressly stipulated that no apportionment shall take place” .
There is English dictum to the effect that the defaulting servant 
might not be able to take advantage of the apportionment legisla­
tion. In considering a section in the English Apportionment Act, 
1870, similar to section 3 of the New Brunswick Property Act,49 
Lush J. said that “ if something has happened during the service 
which forfeits the right to the salary it may well be that the servant 
cannot take advantage of the Act and say: ‘The salary has accrued 
from day to day and I am entitled to receive it’.”50 This view of 
the act should be contrasted with that of Dr. Glanville Williams:51
It is submitted, however, that such an interpretation (as that of 
Lush J. above) would not only perpetuate the harshness of the old 
decisions but would be unsound in principle. The common-law rule 
is not based on the idea of forfeiture. The reason why the servant 
who is dismissed for misconduct cannot claim wages for the current 
period is because he has not completed the period. Thus the rule at 
common law against recovery by the servant seems to be exactly the 
same where the contract is terminated by the death of the master 
or servant, and here there is no question of forfeiture for misconduct.
(My brackets)
46 Legislation dealing with frustrated contracts does not assist the defaulting 
contractor: Tingley v. McKeen, [1954] 4 D.L.R. 392 (N.B.C.A.).
47 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 177.
48 Ibid.
49 Ibid.
50 Moriarty v. Regent's Garage and Engineering Company Limited, [1921]
1 K.B. 423, at p. 435, reversed on another ground, [1921] 2 K.B. 766 (C.A.).
51 Glanville L. Williams, Partial Performance o f Entire Contracts, I (1941),
57 Law Q. Rev. 373, at p. 383.
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The leading New Brunswick case52 on apportionment dealt 
not with master and servant but with landlord and tenant. It was 
held in that case that if a landlord wrongfully evicted his tenant 
he could not take advantage of the apportionment sections of the 
Property Act53 to recover rent. A new trial was ordered to de­
termine whether there had been a wrongful eviction. It is interesting 
to note the words used by Baxter C.J.N.B.:54
Suppose a landlord for no justifiable reason during the currency 
of a term, enters upon his tenant and turns him out of possession, 
is he to take advantage of his own wrong and be enabled to recover 
rent for the proportion of the tenancy up to his wrongful act? Is it 
enough to say that the tenant may counterclaim in damages? I hope 
not. The Act was never intended to deal with tortious interferences with 
the right of any person and to my mind does not do so. Of course 
there may be evictions where for breach of some condition the tenant 
has forfeited his term. But there the breach is the act of the tenant.
He, by his act has put an end to the tenancy or given to his landlord 
an opportunity to do so. The condition was a matter of his contract.
The distinction between a wrongful act of a landlord and a rightful 
one under the terms to which the tenant has assented is too obvious 
to require detailed discussion.
It will be noted that Baxter C.J.N.B. stressed the tortious aspect 
of the eviction. But enough has been said to throw some doubt 
on the right of the defaulting contractor to take advantage of the 
remedial legislation dealing with apportionment.55
(ii) Contracts for Work and Labour
The stumbling block for the defaulting servant in suing in 
quantum meruit is the lack of opportunity for the innocent master 
to accept or reject the services rendered in partial performance. 
This same difficulty arises in contracts for work and labour where 
the work is carried out on the defendant’s property. As was stated 
by Henry J. in Lakin v. Nut tal:56
It cannot be doubted that if, in the event of the failure to perform 
the whole of a contract, the party accepts and gets the benefit of a 
partial performance, the law renders him liable to pay pro rata or 
a quantum meruit therefor. Here, however, the work was done on 
the property of the respondents, and in that case an express acceptance 
was necessary to be shown; and it is to be distinguished from a case 
wherein a change of possession might be evidence of acceptance.
52 Murphy v. Wood, [1941] 4 D.L.R. 454 (N.B. Sup. Ct.).
53 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 177.
54 Murphy v. Wood, [1941] 4 D.L.R. 454 (N.B. Sup. Ct.), at p. 457.
55 In Fenety v.. Fenety and Board o f School Trustees o f Fredericton (1958),
13 D.L.R. (2d) 169, Dickson Co. Ct. J. held that a garnishor could not 
take advantage of the apportionment sections of the New Brunswick 
Property Act in respect of a salary payable monthly.
56 (1879), 3 S.C.R. 685 (Can. Sup. Ct.), at p. 696.
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Thus in a New Brunswick case57 concerning an action by a default­
ing contractor who had installed mill machinery in the defendant’s 
building in partial compliance with his contract, the direction of 
the trial judge that the defendant by keeping the machinery must 
pay the reasonable value was held on appeal to be wrong.58 The 
same barrier has confronted the defaulting contractor in contracts 
for repairs to a car59 and contracts for doing logging work on 
the innocent party’s land.60
The task of raising an inference of a new contract in the 
circumstances outlined above, though extremely difficult, is not 
impossible. Thus where the innocent party promises to pay for the 
partial performance,61 or where he makes some payments for the 
partial performance,62 or does other acts tending to show acquies­
cence63 as distinguished from the ordinary acts of an owner of his 
property, the partial performer may recover on a quantum meruit. 
Indeed, his acquiescence may be held to be a waiver of full per­
formance as a condition precedent, thereby allowing the defaulting 
party to sue on the contract, subject of course to the innocent 
party’s counterclaim or cross-action for damages.64 Finally, where 
the contract for work and labour is not carried out on the innocent 
party’s property, the defaulting party’s task is less difficult because 
usually the innocent party will have an opportunity to accept or 
reject the partial performance.65
57 Waterous el al. v. Morrow (1878), 18 N.B.R. 11 (N.B.C.A.).
58 See also Fairbanks Soap Co. Ltd. v. Sheppard, [1953] 1 S.C.R. 314. But 
note that Cartwright J., who delivered the judgment of the court, said 
at p. 321: “From the evidence it seems probable that the machine in its 
present state has become part of the realty which belongs to the appellant. 
Assuming this to be so it is clear from the reasons in Sumpter v. Hedges, 
[1898] 1 Q.B. 673, that the mere fact of the appellant remaining in possession 
of his land is no evidence upon which an inference of a new contract can 
be founded . . .  In the case at bar the appellant has never elected to take any 
benefit available to him from the unfinished work and Mr. Williston stated 
that he was willing that, in the event o f his appeal succeeding, a term should 
be inserted in the judgment permitting the respondent to remove the machine 
within a reasonable time.” (My emphasis) The judgment so provided.
59 Hyland v. Harrison (1915), 49 N.S.R. 75 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
60 Tuhotte v. Jervis Inlet Lumber Co. (1911), 18 W.L.R. 336 (B.C.C.A.).
61 Mattinson v. Hewson (1909), 43 N.S.R. 339 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
62 Foshay v. Baxter (1849), 6 N.B.R. 335 (N.B. Sup. Ct.).
63 Bain and Torrey v. Eagle (1914), 6 W.W.R. 1551 (Sask. Sup. Ct. in banco).
64 Tanenbaum and Downsview Meadows Ltd. v. Wright- Winston Ltd. (1965),
49 D.L.R. (2d) 386 (Ont. C.A.); Hoenig v. Isaacs, [1952] 2 All E.R. 176 
(C.A.), per Denning L.J., at p. 181. See footnotes 32 and 33 and discussion 
above.
65 Mattinson v. Hewson (1909), 43 N.S.R. 339 (N.S. Sup. Ct.).
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(iii) Contracts for the Sale of Goods
The common law allowed the defaulting seller to recover the 
value of the goods accepted by the purchaser on a quantum meruit66 
Apparently, the buyer had to pay a reasonable price for a short 
delivery under an entire contract even when he had consumed the 
goods in the expectation of a complete delivery and thus had no 
choice whether to accept or reject the goods.67 In any event, the 
New Brunswick Sale o f  Goods Act68 provides:
28. (1) Where the seller delivers to the buyer a quantity of 
goods less than he contracted to sell, the buyer may reject them, but 
if the buyer accepts the goods so delivered he must pay for them at 
the contract rate.
It will be noted that the buyer must now pay for the goods he keeps 
at the contract rate. Similar legislation has been enacted in most 
common law jurisdictions.
(c) Summary
In summary, as a general rule, while the law obliges the in­
nocent party to allow the defaulting party to recover back his 
partial performance (by requiring the innocent party to accept or 
reject the partial performance), this obligation is restricted to the 
situation where the partial performance can be returned in specie, 
and has not been used by or incorporated into the property of the 
innocent party before breach of the contract by the defaulting 
party. Where the partial performance cannot be returned in specie, 
the defaulting contractor is without a remedy unless he can show 
acquiescence or acts from which a new contract can be implied in 
fact. A new contract can be implied in fact only where the innocent 
party has a choice to accept or reject the partial performance after 
the breach. A new contract cannot be implied in fact where the 
innocent party has no such choice for the simple reason that acts 
done under an express contract cannot be used to imply in fact a 
new contract. The courts have refused to impose on the innocent 
party any obligation by law where the partial performance cannot 
be returned in specie.
Should the Defaulting Party be Given a Restitutionary Remedy?
The question remains whether an obligation should be imposed 
on the innocent party to pay for the net value of the benefits con­
66 Emack v. Woods (1908), 39 N.B.R. I l l  (N.B.C.A.); Roy v. J. & D. A. 
Harquail Company Ltd. (1912), 41 N.B.R. 255 (N.B.C.A.).
67 Robert Goff and Gareth Jones, The Law o f Restitution (1st ed., 1966), 
pp. 353, 354.
68 R.S.N.B. 1952, c. 199.
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ferred upon him by the defaulting party.69 Merely because the partial 
performance was rendered under a contract should not prevent the 
court from implying an obligation by law. The courts will do this 
in favour of the innocent party who chooses to rescind and sue in 
quantum meruit.70 Furthermore, they will give a restitutionary remedy 
where benefits are conferred under an ineffective contract.71 The 
true reason for the present position must be found elsewhere.
The argument in favour of not imposing an obligation on the 
innocent party is that to do so would be to reward the defaulting 
party for his breach of contract and impose in effect a new contract 
on the innocent party. On the other hand, the argument in favour 
of imposing an obligation on the innocent party is that not to do 
so will in many cases result in an unjust forfeiture for the defaulting 
party.72 As was stated by Parker J. in the old New Hampshire 
case, Britton v. Turner:1*
By the operation of this rule (that the contract must be fully 
performed in order to recover any part of the consideration). . .  
the party who attempts performance may be placed in a much worse 
situation than he who wholly disregards his contract, and the other 
party may receive much more, by the breach of the contract, than 
the injury which he has sustained by such breach, and more than 
he could be entitled to were he seeking to recover damages by an 
action. (My brackets)
The argument in favour of not imposing an obligation on the 
innocent party loses much of its force where the defaulting party’s 
breach is not wilful. Furthermore, even where the defaulting party’s 
breach is wilful, limitations could be imposed on his recovery so 
as to prevent him from making a profit from his wrong.74 Recovery 
could be further limited to partial performance that was not sub­
stantially different from the kind contracted for. Finally, any resti-
69 See Samuel J. Stoljar, The Great Case o f Cutter v. Powell (1956), 34 Can. 
Bar Rev. 288, where the view is advanced that the present state of the 
law is the result of a debt-contract fallacy and that to speak of giving a 
restitutionary remedy is merely to confuse the issue further.
70 McHugh v. Murray (1884), 24 N.B.R. 12; Swim v. Amos (1895), 33 N.B.R. 
49; Gregory v. Williams (1916), 44 N.B.R. 204; Jardine v. The Prescott 
Lumber Company Limited (1917), 44 N.B.R. 505. See footnote 37 and 
discussion above.
71 Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Company o f Canada, [1954] S.C.R. 725 (Can. 
Sup. Ct.).
72 This is the result of Sumpter v. Hedges, [1898] 1 Q.B. 673 (C.A.).
73 (1834), 6 N.H. 481; reprinted in Woodruff, Cases on Quasi-Contracts 
(3rd ed., 1933), p. 153, at p. 154.
74 Glanville L. Williams, Partial Performance o f Entire Contracts, I (1941),
57 Law Q. Rev. 373, at pp. 395-398.
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tutionary rights allowed the defaulting party would not affect the 
innocent party’s right to sue for damages.75
The majority of American courts have allowed such restitu- 
tionary rights to the defaulting contractor where his breach of 
contract is not wilful. The Restatement o f Contracts states:76
S.357(1) Where the defendant fails or refuses to perform his 
contract and is justified therein by the plaintiff’s own breach of duty 
or non-performance of a condition, but the plaintiff has rendered 
a part performance under the contract that is a net benefit to the 
defendant, the plaintiff can get judgment, except as stated in Sub­
section (2), for the amount of such benefit in excess of the harm that 
he has caused to the defendant by his own breach, in no case exceeding 
a ratable proportion of the agreed compensation, if
(a) the plaintiff’s breach or non-performance is not wilful and 
deliberate; or
(b) the defendant with knowledge that the plaintiff's breach 
of duty or non-performance of condition has occurred or 
will thereafter occur, assents to the rendition of the part 
performance, or accepts the benefit of it, or retains property 
received although its return in specie is still not unreasonably 
difficult or injurious.
(2) The plaintiff has no right to compensation for his 
part performance if it is merely a payment of ernest money, or if the 
contract provides that it may be retained and it is not so greatly in 
excess of the defentant’s harm that the provision is rejected as imposing 
a penalty.
(3) The measure of the defendant’s benefit from the plaintiff’s 
part performance is the amount by which he has been enriched as 
a result of such performance unless the facts are those stated in Sub­
section (lb), in which case it is the price fixed by the contract for such 
part performance, or, if no price is so fixed, a ratable proportion of 
the total contract price.
It is regrettable that a similar approach has not been taken in 
Canada.
Conclusion
The result of the common law rules is that an injustice may be 
caused the defaulting contractor if his part performance exceeds 
the actual damage suffered by the innocent party. And where there 
is injustice there is need for reform. We have already seen that 
the reform legislation enacted so far has been extremely limited.
75 The defaulting party may recover back money paid in part payment of 
the purchase price: Dies v. British and International Mining and Finance 
Corporation, [1939] 1 K.B. 724 (K.B.). Why should the rule be different 
for other types of performance?
76 Restatement o f Contracts #357 (1932).
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The path is probably still open for the Supreme Court of Canada 
to allow a restitutionary remedy on the principle of the Deglman 
case,77 but until it does or until remedial legislation is enacted, 
the injustice will continue, because at the present time the principle 
of Sumpter v. Hedges78 is undoubtedly the law throughout the 
common law provinces of Canada.
77 Deglman v. Guaranty Trust Company o f Canada, [1954] S.C.R. 725 (Can. 
Sup. Ct.).
78 [1898] 1 Q.B. 673 (C.A.).
